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An Archaeological Critique of 'Evidence-Based Management': one 
digression after another 
 
Abstract 
Fundamental problems remain with evidence-based management:  'translating principles based 
on best evidence into organizational practices' (Rousseau, 2006: 256).  We argue that rather than 
being addressed, these problems are treated as digressions.  One explanation for this is an on-
going incoherence: the evidence-based approach relegates narrative to a ghetto category of 
knowledge, but it is itself a narrative.  Moreover, whilst this narrative is becoming more polished 
through repetition and selective assimilation of critique, it is also becoming simplified and less 
interesting.  A Foucauldian, archaeological analysis accounts for this development by locating 
evidence-based management in a broader historical context.  Our analysis shows how the roots 
of incoherence can be informed by older exchanges between evidence and narrative. 
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Although scholarly debates advance, they do so in a non-linear and sometimes 
circuitous direction (Wood and Budwhar, 2014: 2). 
In a word, my work is digressive, and it is progressive too, and at the same time... 
Digressions incontestably are the sunshine; they are the life, the soul of reading 
(Tristram Shandy, 1985: 95). 
We examine the roots of evidence-based management (EBMgt), adopting a contrasting method 
for framing knowledge than that associated with the 'evidence' in EBMgt.  We analyse ostensibly 
the high-water mark for EBMgt advocates, The Oxford Handbook of Evidence-based 
Management (The Handbook) (Rousseau, 2012), but suggest The Handbook, and advocates, 
have been unable to innovate theoretically.  The movement is more preoccupied with 
establishing jurisdictional claims than questions of science.  The explanation for a lack of 
theoretical progress is that at the heart of EBMgt lies incoherence: advocates denigrate narrative, 
and narrative forms of knowledge,
1
 but are themselves relating a narrative about research and 
practice in management studies (Morrell, 2008).  This narrative depends on a simplistic 
comparison between management and medicine, and corollary, narrow constructions of evidence 
(Learmonth, 2008). 
An unwavering, unreflective commitment to this narrative means advocates are repeating 
something that is becoming less interesting.  Another consequence of this unwavering 
commitment is that advocates are unable to engage with criticisms, and instead have to treat even 
fundamental problems as mere digressions.  Using Foucault's concept of archaeological 
excavation (Burrell, 1988; Foucault, 2002a, b; Heracleous, 2006), the paper excavates EBMgt by 
situating both evidence and narrative in a broader historical context.  Doing so shows how the 
roots of incoherence lie in older exchanges between evidence and narrative.  Instead of 
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denigrating narrative, and narrative forms of knowledge, the paper argues for equivalence 
between evidence and narrative, or rather, for recognizing narrative as evidence.  In doing so it 
incorporates distinctive features of narrative and uses digression not to avoid problems with 
EBMgt, but to surface them.   
Evidence-based Management 
The evidence-based approach has had advocates, and critics; with some suggesting the need for 
dialogue between these camps - see Morrell (2012) and Tourish (2013) for recent reviews.  
Critics are not against evidence per se, but problematize the construction of evidence within 
EBMgt.  An influential paper in the British Journal of Management (Tranfield, Denyer and 
Smart, 2003) proposed the evidence-based approach as a contribution to several important 
debates in management studies (Tranfield and Starkey, 1998).  Prominent among these are rigour 
/ relevance (Grey, 2001; Starkey and Madan, 2001; Weick, 2001); the two modes of knowledge 
production (Huff and Huff, 2001; also, MacLean and MacIntosh, 2002); and the status of 
management knowledge, and management practice (Hatchuel, 2001; Pettigrew, 2001).  These 
remain pertinent to BJM readers' interests (Aken, 2005; Hodgkinson and Starkey, 2011; Thorpe 
et al. 2011; Wilmott, 2012; Learmonth, Lockett and Dowd, 2012), but little theoretical progress 
has been made by advocates of evidence-based management. 
We can make this claim because later iterations have incorporated changes that speak to some 
omissions - explicit consideration of ethics is now 'one of the four fundamental activities' 
(Rousseau, 2012: 4), while it was absent in both (Tranfield et al., 2003) and Rousseau (2006).  
However, in The Handbook we see a distilled version of the same central messages mobilising 
critics: narrative relegated to a ghetto category; EBMgt as 'the' answer; the value of technique; 
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the need for commensuration of knowledge; and the lack of managers' enthusiasm or 
engagement with EBMgt being exclusively, or principally, a failing of practitioners (Clegg, 
2005; Fox, 2003; Hammersley, 2001; Hope, 2004; Learmonth, 2008; Morrell, 2008). 
An Archaeological Perspective 
To continue to develop this point it is helpful to introduce two interdependent concepts from 
Foucault: discursive formation and excavation.  'Discursive formation' is a useful way to 
interrogate the roots of any intellectual movement, school or regime (Foucault, 2002 a b).  A 
discursive formation is a 'general system of thought' (Foucault, 2002b: 83), underpinned by 
shared rules and understandings that govern 'emergence, delimitation, and specification' 
(Foucault, 2002a: 49); such a system, 'defines the conditions that make a controversy or problem 
possible' (Foucault, 2002b: 83).  Discursive formations evolve over time, as currents of thought 
establish the, 'conditions necessary for the appearance of an object of discourse, the historical 
conditions required if one is to "say anything" about it' (Foucault, 2002a: 49).  Discursive 
formations are more than simply a way of looking at, and talking about, the world.  They are a 
space, a set of possibilities and constraints about what we are, in a sense, allowed to say.  
Excavation is how we gain access to the contours of a discursive formation, in an attempt to 
situate social and intellectual categories in history, and to unearth their aetiology and 
foundations, though it is in some sense a paradoxical exercise since we cannot step outside of 
time.  We are all historically situated and locked into talking about phenomena from a fixed 
point of view.   
To give a brief example, Foucault's History of Madness (2009) identifies that madness is not 
something that can be categorized as an absolute - as a medical or religious, or philosophical 
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phenomenon.  Instead it is a product and residue of history, of institutions, social formations and 
of cultural epochs and their transition through different phases. Indeed the categories of mental 
illness have been greatly expanded with each subsequent Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders, not because there is now a higher proportion of people with mental health 
problems, but because of the professionalization of therapists, the realities of state funding of 
treatments which only apply to “recognised” illnesses, and simply medical fashion (an example 
of mimetic isomorphism). The expansion of illness categories engenders its own evidence and 
brings about its own reality; an expanded list of mental illnesses, frames a larger set of actions as 
abnormal and individuals as mentally ill.  Excavation concerns itself with the 'historical 
construction of meaning' (Khalfa, 2009: xiv).  In the History of Madness, excavation traces the 
legacy and influence of power in shaping and producing social categories.  From this 
perspective, 'evidence' in EBMgt is also something with a history.  It is not something that is in 
any sense transcendental, nor is it the result of any kind of gradual discovery or progressive 
understanding that we might associate with models of scientific progress.  Instead, it is 
something that has emerged as a consequence of shifts in shared ways of representing social 
phenomena.   
Using Foucault's language in a local and narrow way, and representing the evidence-based 
approach to management as a discursive formation, part of our argument is that little theoretical 
progress has been made because the Tranfield et al. (2003) paper was instrumental in setting the 
parameters for this formation (Foucault, 2002b).  Using Foucault's language in a broader way, 
we could locate EBMgt in the context of empiricism.  EBMgt can be seen as deriving from 
empiricism in at least two senses. First, in its emphasis on evidence based on experience (in that 
sense seen as a posteriori knowledge, rather than a priori, conceptual or abstract knowledge 
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independent of experience). Secondly, in terms of the conception of evidence as something that 
can be measured, can be additive and can be systematized or integrated across discrete sources or 
experiments because it is already defined and collected in a standardized, homogenized manner. 
In both these senses, EBMgt operates within the grander discursive formation of empiricism. 
Indeed, this is also a fruitful way in which to locate the Tranfield et al. (2003) paper and doing so 
helps to excavate the contours of 'evidence' as the foundational concept of EBMgt. 
Excavating Evidence 
The Tranfield et al. (2003) paper, in structure and intent, is an argument prosecuted in the best 
traditions of Empiricism, with a characteristically scientific and progressive title: ‘Towards a 
methodology for developing evidence-informed management knowledge by means of systematic 
review' (Tranfield et al., 2003).  Rather than intended as negative, by 'the best traditions of 
Empiricism', is meant the paper uses purposive, reasoned argument to develop a proposal for 
empirical research, for consideration by a scientific community.  In doing so it follows sustained 
engagement with some important questions in the philosophy of science.  Again, rather than 
being intended as negative, 'characteristically scientific and progressive' is meant to signal an 
association with Empiricist ideals. 
The foundations of Empiricism lie in the work of the 17th Century philosopher John Locke 
(Russell, 1984; Woolhouse, 2005, 2007).  Locke gives the following account of his project, from 
the introductory 'Epistle to Readers' in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690): 
The commonwealth of learning is not at this time without master-builders, whose 
mighty designs, in advancing the sciences, will leave lasting monuments to 
posterity... in an age that produces such masters as... the incomparable Mr Newton... 
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it is ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a 
little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way of knowledge. 
It is because of Locke that philosophy, in relation to scientific questions, is sometimes said to 
play one of two broad roles.  The first role, in keeping with the traditions of Empiricism, is as an 
under-labourer for science.  The under-labourer allegory is a rich one when we consider the role 
and intended benefits of the evidence-based approach.  EBMgt is retrospective ('evidence' has 
already happened) and less likely to lead to theoretical innovation, but done well, and applied to 
appropriate questions, it can be a valuable, ground-clearing exercise: building on the work of 
others, helpfully organising what has already gone before, prior to guiding research or informing 
an intervention.  This chimes with the strident title of Pfeffer and Sutton's Hard Facts, 
Dangerous Halftruths, and Total Nonsense (2006), with Tranfield et al.'s (2003: 220) goal of, 
'developing and enhancing the quality of management reviews and ensuring that they are 
practitioner and context sensitive', with Briner, Denyer and Rousseau's (2009) ambition of 
'concept clean-up time', and with Rousseau's (2006: 260) emphasis on, 'reliable and valid 
information when making managerial and organizational decisions.'   
The second role philosophy can play in relation to scientific questions is to support critique.  
This is what motivates many critics of EBMgt.  Critics have no universal prejudice against the 
methods and techniques underpinning or associated with EBMgt (meta-analysis, systematic 
reviews, replication).  These are a staple in applied psychology and self-evidently have their 
place (reference anonymized).  Nor do critics have a universal prejudice against positivist 
research, or work in the Empiricist tradition.  They are not against these things, or against 
evidence.  What critics resist is homogenization and the idea that consequently EBMgt is a threat 
to pluralism (reference anonymized). 
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The schism between these two roles: under-labourer or critic can usefully be traced to Locke.  
This is not simply because he coined the under-labourer metaphor - but because in his work we 
find the first attempt to apply the principles of the experimental, hard sciences to social science, 
and to the first empirical theory of mind.  If one believes that the goal and methods of the natural 
sciences are always analogues for the social sciences, the under-labourer metaphor works.  If not, 
the comparison awakens the critic. 
Digressions from Ontology 
One thing the Tranfield et al. (2003) paper does more explicitly than subsequent advocates is 
comprehensively list ontological differences between the kinds of phenomena medicine and 
management study (see also Hewison, 1997, 2004; Walshe and Rundall, 2001; Grey, 2004).  In 
doing so it maps out their consequently different characteristics as fields of inquiry.  Drawing on 
Tranfield and Starkey (1998) it describes management research as:  
'soft' rather than 'hard' 'applied' rather than 'pure', ‘rural' rather than 'urban', and 
'divergent' rather than 'convergent' [whilst] medical research enjoys considerable and 
extensive epistemological consensus, this is untrue of management research, in 
general (Tranfield et al., 2003: 212). 
Following this discussion (pp. 212-13), the paper incorporates a page-long table, with 19 
dimensions each represented by a dichotomy between, 'medical science as an applied field of 
study stemming from the biological sciences, and management research as an applied field with 
strong connections to the social sciences.'  Writers subsequently advocating evidence-based 
management in The Handbook have digressed from such questions.  They have turned away 
from a difficult conversation about these epistemological differences relating to research, 
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towards a simpler conversation about differences relating to practice, and about the nature of 
medicine and management as professions.  For example, Barends et al. (2012: 39) warn against 
any critics who assert, 'that evidence-based practice in our professional field is not possible 
because management is not a profession.'  But, they are creating and battling an imaginary 
opponent, because (as Tranfield et al. 2003 show) the problems of comparing management to 
medicine run much wider and deeper than questions of comparative professional status or 
practice (Grey, 2004). 
The role this imaginary opponent plays in advancing the argument for EBMgt is in helping to 
swap difficult questions of ontology for easier questions of jurisdiction.  Since Tranfield et al.'s 
(2003) account, simplified analogies based on practice are a recurrent theme in EBMgt 
discourse, for instance in Latham (2009: ix), 'few of us would expect a neurosurgeon to remove a 
brain tumour... by drawing on intuition alone' and throughout Rousseau's Presidential address 
(2006).  Rousseau's opening chapter to The Handbook also promotes this view (Rousseau, 2012: 
19-27 passim): 
Not being a formal profession, management has not been subject to the forces in 
place in other fields...  Mainstreaming new professional practices takes time.  An 
entire generation of managers educated to use and access evidence may be needed 
before organizations make widespread use of behavioural science... The professional 
field we call management is still in its infancy. 
Yet the central problem facing EBMgt is not whether enough people can be trained and educated 
to follow its principles, it is whether these principles are appropriate in the first place. At the 
same time as being simplified in terms of the comparison with medicine, EBMgt discourse has 
been more simplistic about the relationship to practice, predicated on scrutinising the failings and 
responsibilities of managers (Giluk and Rynes-Weller, 2012: 132).  The more simplistic 
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comparison with medicine, and the stock character of the reluctant, untrained or unwilling 
manager, both serve to establish jurisdiction, and support territorial claims.  In this way, 
digression underpins promotional activities as well as commodification through licensing, 
accreditation, training, certification, schooling, as a manifesto-like opening paper from the recent 
special issue indicates: 
Given that management (unlike medicine) does not require managers or graduating 
MBAs to pass standardized exams, the medical experience suggests that the most 
practical ways of increasing the coverage of EBMgt in business schools may be to (1) 
build a larger cadre of instructors willing and able to teach it (a goal of this special 
issue), and (2) push for its inclusion in accreditation criteria (Rynes, Rousseau and 
Barends, 2014: 313). 
Whilst specialization can support jurisdictional claims, it can narrow our collective scope to 
address social problems if we fail to make innovations in theory.  Academic schools gather 
momentum by establishing consensus, but they also need to build in novelty to sustain the 
interest of the academic community.  This resonates with concerns by Dunne and Martin, (2006, 
p. 517) about the role of business schools, 'we are in a period of diminishing returns to research... 
because we have ploughed away at figuring out everything within narrow disciplines and the 
only way we can study those narrow disciplines is to assume away all the complexity and make 
them narrower and narrower' (in Hodgkinson and Starkey, 2011, p. 365).  Lefebvre's play on the 
metaphor of the field is appropriate here, 'each specialization stakes out its own particular mental 
and social space [the] sectioning-off of a 'field''.  The field yields, 'a permanent niche' in which 
the specialist can, 'curl up happily' (Lefebvre, 1991: 107).   
The boundaries of fields, discursive formations, set the perimeters of a space where knowledge 
can be cultivated, and taken to market.  EBMgt, owing to a lack of theoretical innovation, is 
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becoming this kind of field - characterized by questions relating to territory rather than scientific 
curiosity.  This is a narrative that depends on digression and follows this trajectory: problem > 
digression > jurisdictional claims > rent claiming (see Table 1). 
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Table 1.  Digression from basic problems supporting the trajectory: specialization > jurisdiction > rent claiming. 
Problem Digression Enables 
Specialization 
by 
Enables 
Jurisdictional 
Claims by 
Rent claiming 
Key 
ontological 
differences 
between 
management 
research and 
medical 
science  
hindrances that 
block the further 
development of 
[EBMgt] are the 
same hindrances 
that blocked the 
development of 
Evidence-Based 
Medicine 
(Barends et al, 
2012: 25). 
Replacing 
concerns over 
ontological 
differences 
between 
medicine and 
management, 
for 
comparisons in 
terms of 
professional 
practice  
Staking out a 
territorial 
claim, based 
on profess-
ionalization 
of practice 
rather than 
scientific 
knowledge 
seeking out evidence-informed consultants and scholars as contacts 
[helps] the individual practitioner deepen... expertise as an evidence-
based professional.  (Rousseau, 2012: 18). 
among the solutions offered by consulting organizations... is “fact-
based” decision making, with the implicit promise that expensive 
consultants will provide... better strategic decisions. The consultants 
may very well be on to something here: evidence may be just the 
antidote. (Madhavan and Mahoney, 2012: 84).  
MBA as well as DBA programs should include rigorous training in 
EBMgt, including systematic review and research synthesis (Aken and 
Van Romme, 2012: 56). 
Evidence 
alone is often 
insufficient 
and 
incomplete; 
translation... 
is not un-
problematic 
after being 
exposed to 
relevant research, 
practicing 
managers may 
disbelieve, 
dismiss, or simply 
ignore the 
findings. What are 
the underlying 
sources of such 
behavior? (Giluk 
and Rynes, 2012: 
132). 
Pathologizing 
managers and 
imposing a 
power 
imbalance, 
based on 
comparative 
understanding 
of the 
evidence-based 
approach and 
associated 
techniques 
Cementing 
differences in 
power 
chances that 
translate into 
inequalities 
in forms of 
capital 
(expertise); 
these can be 
commodified 
Formal training, directed reading and developing a network of 
evidence-savvy contacts are some ways evidence-based managers 
acquire this knowledge (Rousseau, 2012: 72). 
The issue... is not so much that managers do not undertake or value 
evidence, but they appear not well oriented to turning to the academic 
community for support (Speicher-Bocija and Adams, 2012: 294). 
There is... a center for evidence-based management, (see 
http://www.cEBMgta.org/) (AMLE Associate Editor and CEMBa 
member, Bartunek, 2012: 684). 
After reading the essay, I wondered if there are other resources 
available to instructors who may also wish to teach using evidence-
based approaches. I found that the Center for Evidence-Based 
Management (http://www.cEBMgta.org/resources-and-tools/) has 
several (Bartunek, 2014: 102). 
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Table 1 shows these processes at work by considering how the story set out in Tranfield et al. 
(2003) has been simplified in The Handbook, and in editorial comments in Academy of 
Management Learning and Education (Bartunek, 2012, 2014).  Italics are direct quotes - points 
in Tranfield et al. (2003) (column 1) have been simplified in The Handbook (column 2) to 
support specialization (column 3), jurisdictional claims (column 4), and the prospect of 'curling 
up happily' (Lefebvre, 1991: 107), or rent claiming (column 5). 
Digressions from the Political Economy of Research 
Specialist knowledge and territorial claims are one part of the process of establishing rent claims.  
These claims also need to be accompanied by practices driven by homogenization, because that 
is necessary in order to support relations of exchange.  This is why the mechanisms of 
commensuration and aggregation in the evidence-based approach are so important.  Having a 
common metric for scientific work, and being able to accumulate 'evidence' supports the 
commodification of knowledge.  To return to Locke's metaphor, in the social sciences, when 
specialization, homogenization and commodification of knowledge happen, movements become 
the under-labourer for capital not science. 
For this critique to have purchase it does not need to be anywhere near as grand as to call 
capitalism into question.  All it needs to do is show tensions between the figure of the under-
labourer and their pursuit of knowledge, and the figure of the specialist and their pursuit of rent.  
Such tensions are evident in promotional comments in AMLE where successive editorials 
promote, then 'discover' the Center for Evidence-Based Management (CEBMgta) (see table 1).  
The mission of this non-profit organization (April 10, 2014) is, 'to promote, develop and teach 
evidence-based practice to enhance the profession of management. We provide support and 
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resources to managers, consultants, teachers, academics and others interested in evidence-based 
management.'  Digression from basic ontological questions promotes codification: of things 
which are uncodifiable (ontological differences between medicine and social science), or tacit 
(situated judgement and expertise), and hence it supports processes of commodification.  To 
continue to entertain the idea there are ontological differences (which are irresolvable and 
incommensurable) would be problematic because it is a stumbling block.  Instead, comparison in 
terms of professional practice is safer because it apparently acknowledges explicit difference, but 
in a way that supports jurisdictional claims, and boosts legitimacy by rhetorical attachment to a 
higher prestige profession, physician envy rather than physics envy. 
In contrast to comparisons with medicine as practice, which pepper The Handbook, description 
of ontological differences between medicine and management are hard to see.  There is one 
parenthetic reference to the ontological diversity of management and organization studies 
(Speicher-Bocija and Adams, 2012: 301), with only the two egregiously critical chapters 
(Hornung, 2012; Hodgkinson, 2012) identifying this issue as problematic for the evidence-based 
approach.  Jelley, Carroll, and Rousseau, refer to these differences in an interesting way (2012: 
348):  
We have introduced students, albeit briefly, to philosophical issues regarding the 
nature of knowledge, and different ontological and epistemological perspectives...  
Even brief introductions alert students to the idea that they may encounter different, 
valuable perspectives during their searches for the best available evidence. 
This digressive style is like that of the colonial tourist, for whom historical curiosities are 
identified on the way to an agreed destination - where 'the best' evidence is.  Because The 
Handbook has swapped questions of ontological differences for comparisons about practice, 
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what a tour such as this overlooks is the entire, principal and express purpose of some 
'ontological and epistemological perspectives.'  Many critical theorists would explicitly and 
avowedly deny the validity of any claims to 'best available evidence' (Hornung, 2012).  The 
digressive 'brief introduction' on the way to 'best available evidence' conjured up a strange 
image: how would someone conduct such a tour? Consistent with our perspective of narrative as 
evidence, we present a narrative-inspired episode as a way to highlight the incoherences within 
current conceptions of EBMgt: 
FADE IN: 
 
INT. LECTURE THEATRE, DAY. 
 
A LECTURER stands behind a PEDESTAL, faced by banks of 
occupied, tiered seats.  Sunken spots arranged like 
dots on dice flood the softly carpeted, dark room.  
Behind them is a mammoth SCREEN on which is projected 
the words  
 
"Evidence Based Management 101." 
 
LECTURER 
OK, everyone ready?  
 
Some STUDENTS sit up, rows of faces, many hidden 
behind glowing APPLES. 
 
  LECTURER (CONT'D) 
Good morning, now before we start... 
 
They CLICK on a hand-held remote, so the screen is 
captioned "CRITICAL THEORY 1" 
 
  LECTURER (CONT'D) 
Right, some people, appalled by the horrors 
of the last century would want us to fight 
and resist, as a matter of deep, 
existential belief anytime we ever heard 
people talk about science, facts and human 
affairs in the same breath.  Got that?   
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SILENCE. 
 
CLICK. "CRITICAL THEORY 2" 
 
  LECTURER (CONT'D) 
Moving on, some others suggest we should 
resist some forms of Capitalism including 
the commodification of things like culture 
and knowledge, and that we should engage in 
perpetual critique, because otherwise we 
become enmeshed in relations of exchange 
and this alienates us from our true nature 
as human beings.  Got that? 
 
SILENCE. 
 
OK? Moving on, let us start by looking at 
this hierarchy of evidence. 
 
The screen shows a PYRAMID, captioned HIERARCHY OF 
EVIDENCE, by the pyramid an ARROW points from its base 
"Anecdotes Or Opinions" to the top "Systematic 
Review". 
 
 
The screenplay is quite an extrapolation from the preceding quote.  Still, it seems to echo what 
happens in The Handbook's dedicated section, 'Ethics and Stakeholder Considerations' 
(Rousseau, 2012: 14-15).  This opens with a quote by Peter Drucker, directly underneath is a 
quote from Theodor Adorno.  It then discusses an example of, a 'tough call' between, 'a huge 
airstrike that might kill hundreds of civilians' and a, 'smaller attack... killing dozens of militants'.  
This example is used to illustrate the need to consider stakeholders when making decisions.  It is 
difficult to follow the connection to EBMgt at this point, and even more difficult to see the 
relevance of  the quote from Adorno.  Adorno opposed the commodification of knowledge and  
was optimistic about the generative power of art and aesthetics; one might  therefore assume he 
would feel exceedingly uncomfortable with a hegemonic discourse such as EBMgt; invoking his 
authority seems conspicuously out of place. But, what this all indicates, is that the dedicated 
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section on ethics, like the 'brief introductions' on the way to 'best available evidence' is a 
digression. 
In the course of repeating and refining the story, occasional digression is how critique has been 
assimilated.  This is also the role the two ending, critical chapters in The Handbook, play: 
digressions from the narrative that can be bracketed but also identified to demonstrate critical 
perspectives are entertained, at the same time as uncoupled from the real business of The 
Handbook.  Hodgkinson (2012) and Hornung (2012) (both CEBMgta members) offer 
intrinsically valuable contributions.  However, in their setting they are treated as rhetorically 
useful digressions, rather than incorporated into debate; their role is identified in a recent review, 
'To its credit, this volume embraces the criticism of EBMgt with two thoughtful concluding 
chapters' (Sitkin and Rader, 2014: 2-3).  But is 'the' criticism 'embraced'?  Criticisms of EBMgt 
are multiple and diverse, and movements are not typically criticized most heavily from within.  
Although embraced in the literal sense of being within the covers of The Handbook, the 
introduction digresses from these 'critical views', re-packaging and sanitizing them (see table 2).  
Here is how the role of the chapters is described in The Handbook's introduction (xxvii), 
'Presenting critical views at this early stage serves to remind us that potential unintended 
consequences must be addressed before EBMgt can fully realize its full promise.'  The end result, 
where the evidence-based approach remains the one best way, will only have been slightly 
delayed by such criticisms - these are temporary digressions.  There is such certainty, it implies 
prescience, correcting unintended consequences before they even happen.  There is no doubt 
problems will be addressed, that evidence-based management is an unadulterated good, and that 
the end destination is inevitable.   
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It is interesting to speculate about the implied trajectory in the phrase, 'at this early stage'.  It 
suggests such contributions will not be presented in future, or perhaps be the basis for 'brief 
introductions' satirized in the screenplay above.  This framing of the chapters does not reflect 
either Hodgkinson (2012) or Hornung (2012), who are also collectively mis-described as 
expansionist, 'Both critiques suggest constructive ways of balancing and expanding the influence 
of constituents so that EBMgt’s benefits are more broadly shared (xxviii).'  Instead, they are both 
conspicuously cautionary and critical. 
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Table 2.  Digressions in The Handbook 
Verbatim extracts from respective chapters Re-packaged and re-
described in the 
Introduction as 
continuing and refining the focus on methods and implementation will not be useful to address the 
fundamental criticism of EBMgt as an ideological project to advance a particular form of management 
research while marginalizing others 
The core of EBMgt forms an optimistic belief in scientific progress, what it seems to lack, so far, is a 
critical epistemological debate on the limits of scientific rationality and objectivity in light of the ideological 
foundations and disparities that characterize our field. 
the Frankfurt School [show] EBMgt seems to fit into the described pattern of instrumental rationality. That 
is, it predominantly focuses on technical and practical aspects, but turns a blind eye on the political 
embededdness and interest-guided nature of the generation, evaluation, transfer, and application of research 
evidence. 
Rousseau and colleagues have countered the criticisms outlined above with rather technical arguments... 
they have missed the deeper point that some lines of research may just not be compatible with each other, 
because not only their methods, but their underlying worldviews, assumptions, and even the language or 
jargon they use are so fundamentally different that they do not even share a common understanding of 
phenomena, concepts and terminology 
at the core of the radical disagreement on the concept of EBMgt are incompatible paradigms regarding the 
nature of scientific rationality and progress  
Hornung calls for 
balance in the 
interests that 
research on 
management and 
organizational 
practices serves... 
motivated by the 
concern that EBMgt 
focuses too much on 
managers and not 
enough on 
employees and the 
public  
evidence-based management is an inherently political project, which risks creating an illusion of rationality, 
a multilayered façade masking underlying fundamental differences of interpretation, purpose, and power 
among the various stakeholders situated on both sides of the academic-practitioner/policy divide. 
failure to recognize and accommodate theoretical perspectives and research methods antithetical to EBMgt 
as legitimate forms of management inquiry and render these issues explicitly discussable would constitute an 
unacceptable form of hegemony 
the fear that the EBMgt community could come to dominate the field is not an unreasonable concern. 
the evidence-based practice movement must ultimately accommodate on a more systematic basis the 
important influence of power and politics in organizational life, rather than downplaying them as it currently 
does, treating political problems as a minor by-product of an otherwise radical improvement to organizational-
Hodgkinson explores 
the politics of 
evidence and ways 
to reconcile threats 
that use of evidence 
might pose to the 
interests of various 
constituencies 
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decision processes 
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Having excavated 'evidence', let us now excavate 'narrative'. 
Excavating Narrative 
Narrative has far older, pre-historical, roots than the Lockean account of evidence.  However it is 
instructive, in trying to discern a point of first contact in terms of exchanges between evidence 
and narrative, to look at one aspect of the historical reception of Locke's work.  This can usefully 
be traced to a novel stretching the limits of narrative: The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy: 
Gentleman.  Ostensibly a biographical novel, it is largely about the impossibility of writing a 
biographical novel, and subverts both the form of the book and the genre of biography.  Contrary 
to its title, the book does not ever really describe Tristram Shandy's life, or give his opinions.  
Sterne collapses, stops and stretches time throughout; one character, Toby, takes his pipe out to 
speak, begins saying, 'I think...' and we only get to read the second half of his sentence 31 pages 
later (in the 1985 edition); another is informed by letter of an event having happened, but at the 
time of reading the letter the event lies 15 days in the future.  When we skip from chapter 23 to 
chapter 25 (volume IV) the narrator explains there was no chapter 24 because he tore it out.  At 
one point, Sterne includes a blank page for the reader to draw one of the characters on, based on 
a cursory description, providing the reader with, 'one page, at least, within thy covers, which 
MALICE will not blacken and which IGNORANCE cannot misrepresent' (Sterne, 1985: 452 
original capitals); at another he draws a squiggle on the page to show a character who is themself 
illustrating an action 'a flourish with his stick' (Ricks, 1985: 8).   
What does this have to do with evidence?  The digressive style Sterne was promoting is not 
simply humorous play, it needs to be seen in terms of the broader political and ideological 
context for Tristram Shandy, where narrative is key to understanding Sterne's wider contribution 
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to 18th Century life, and thought; and to our lives and thoughts since.  Sterne's digressive style 
makes Tristram Shandy a landmark as it rails against the tradition stories should have a 
beginning, middle and end.  It is problematic to say where Tristram Shandy (the narrator) or 
Tristram Shandy (the novel) begins.  In terms of the narrator, Tristram, his, 'adult opinions and 
circumstances are set side by side with the fragmented account of his conception, birth, and 
childhood' (Briggs, 1985: 511).  One of the most famous passages describes the timing of 
Tristram Shandy's conception, an act which coincides exactly with Tristram's mother asking his 
father to wind the clock up - both these domestic matters were regularly carried out on Sundays.  
Tristram Shandy the novel, 'does not quite begin or end at any specific place' (Briggs, 1985: 515-
6).  After about 300 pages, Sterne has Tristram Shandy explain, 'from this point properly... the 
story of my LIFE and OPINIONS sets out... I have but been clearing the ground' (Sterne, 1985: 
336 original capitals) although, as mentioned, he never does quite get around to discussing those. 
Iser (1988) identifies it as the first novel to attack our concept of time, 'permanent digression [is] 
the vital counter-movement through which writing defends itself against the narrative process' 
(Iser, 1988: 80).  This style, the kind only narrative can afford, comes some 230 years before 
parallels in Burrell's iconoclastic, Pandemonium: Towards a Retro-Organization Theory; a text 
designed to be, 'disruptive, randomizing and reliant upon the reader’s creativity... to underplay 
the importance of developing an argument in a linear, logical way' (Burrell, 1997: 1-27 passim); 
and consequently a warning of the 'dangers of Enlightenment linearity' (Hancock and Tyler, 
2005: 27).  Sterne had a comparable goal, and one that helps us understand historical tensions 
between evidence and narrative.  Tristram Shandy satirizes Locke's ideas of Empiricism.  Pierce 
(1996: 8) calls it the 'most powerful critique of Locke's theory of knowledge'.  In his Essay, 
Locke's main assertion was that sensory experience was the basis for all knowledge.  The Essay 
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lies at the beginnings of our modern theory of mind and is the basis for the discipline of 
psychology.  Locke (1990: 33, original emphasis) begins the most famous passage in his Essay 
by asking, 'Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, 
without any ideas: How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store which the 
busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety?'  He 
continues:  
To this I answer, in one word, from experience. In that all our knowledge is founded; 
and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation employed either, about 
external sensible objects or about the internal operations of our minds perceived and 
reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the 
materials of thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the 
ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring. 
For Locke, experience and observation were the bedrock of scientific progress and of human 
knowledge; observation and analysis were how we learned anything about the world, and what 
made us human.  It is difficult to overstate the weight of Locke's thinking on 18th Century 
scholarship or social practices such as education and research (Bedard, 2003).  His influence was 
immense, partly because of the brilliance of his theory of knowledge, the basis of Enlightenment 
thought, and partly because it coincided with a scientific revolution led by Newton.  Moreover, it 
was because Locke's political philosophy happened to be shared by contemporary elites.  Locke's 
ideas were adopted in the then British constitution, prominent in thinking associated with French 
revolutionaries, and still underpin elements of governance in contemporary democracies.  Within 
the U.S., in the Supreme Court, we see the clearest example of Locke's constitutional advice to 
separate executive, legislature and judiciary (Russell, 1984; Shovlin, 2000).  Even so, Locke's 
brilliance cast a lot of other ideas into shadow, arguably crushing subsequent innovation and 
squeezing out scholarly space.  Even at the time Sterne was writing, some 70 years after the 
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publication of the Essay, narrative seemed to afford the only space where one could truly 
transgress Lockean thought.  The passage referred to earlier relating Tristram's conception, and 
the winding of the clock, is a pregnant way to poke fun at Locke's ideas of the blank slate, of 
association, and the linearity of time implicit in Empiricism.  Sterne is asking questions like: if 
we are blank slates and products of experience, which experiences are formative and when do 
our lives begin?   
Tristram Shandy had its enemies amongst other narrators, for instance Samuel Johnson did not 
question whether it would last, but stated simply it, 'did not last' (Ricks, 1985: 8).  He was 
already wrong at the time of his review 17 years after TS had been published and was enjoying 
wild success (Douglas and Douglas, 2001: viii), but his comically cruel assessment is useful 
inspiration in considering EBMgt.  It may seem strange to suggest the evidence-based movement 
'did not last', but as a 'movement' it has not really moved far from Tranfield et al, (2003).  The 
earliest criticisms (Learmonth, 2006) are still unanswered, and advocates are still telling the 
same exhortatory story.  The paradoxical suggestion evidence-based management 'did not last' 
helps to consider whether Tranfield et al. (2003) was the high water mark (rather than The 
Handbook or the recent special issue in AMLE).  It also signals the dangers for advocates of 
repeating the same old story.  What we have in 'evidence-based management' now, as in 2003, is 
a label that can be a useful banner term to continue prosecuting important and worthwhile 
debates: rigour / relevance, how we engage with practice; how we conduct and review research - 
the role of replication, meta-analysis, bias against null results, and so on.  But, the links to 
evidence-based medicine still indicate an approach that has a narrow view of evidence, that 
denigrates narrative as a form of knowledge and that is ontologically unsophisticated.  This 
narrative about evidence still faces fundamental problems, and in response, it digresses. 
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What is lacking in the literature on EBMgt is a revealed appreciation that firstly EBMgt is a 
narrative, and secondly that narrative can be evidence.  Barry and Elmes (1997), in a masterful 
discussion of the field of strategy from a narrative perspective, show that contrary to its 
apparently non-fictional nature, strategy is at its core a story; both in terms of strategy as a field 
and in terms of strategy as a manifestation in particular situations.  There are many parallels with 
EBMgt.  Materiality, voice, protagonists, plots, and readership are essential considerations in 
establishing credibility in strategy and EBMgt - even though these inherently fictional elements 
may need to be disguised in pursuit of credibility (Barry and Elmes, 1997).  Yes, strategy 
frameworks employ “evidence” as input and judgement in the process in order to provide 
directions for investment and action, but this process is contextual; embedded in a particular 
historical moment that conditions the role of evidence, and what is accepted as evidence and for 
what purposes.  The same evidence may be interpreted in divergent ways, leading to divergent 
response (Trank, 2014).  In fact, difference rather than homogenization is the desirable state in 
strategy (Porter, 1996).  Expanding this line of argument, social studies of science (e.g. Latour 
and Woolgar, 1979) have shown that the process of scientific advancement is one characterized 
by allegiances, agendas, historicity and serendipity. 
Now to the second suggestion, that narrative can be evidence (something that can be the basis for 
reasonable inferences).  EBMgt does not deny narratives are a form of evidence, but places such 
things as anecdotes, cases, texts, perspectives, statements, and other fragments at the bottom of 
an evidence hierarchy.  These are not just evidence though, they are also essential to theory 
generation: to pushing understanding in ways not currently appreciated and unavailable from 
pre-existing data and research (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).  Where 
needed, this can be done in ways that address traditionally orthodox concerns such as validity 
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and reliability (Gibbert, Ruigrok and Wicki, 2008), making the process palatable and even 
legitimate to more deductive-minded scholars. There are many instances where narratives 
pertaining to a few cases or events, or to isolated ones, have delivered outstanding advances in 
our understanding. Piaget’s studies of his three children formed the foundation of our 
understanding of child cognitive development, Freud’s descriptions of his clients shaped 
psychotherapy, anthropological studies such as those of Levi Strauss and Malinowski spurred 
our understanding of how societies develop and function, and atypical cases of pathology often 
enhance understanding of norms. Indeed, a single disconfirming or unique case can be an 
extremely powerful form of evidence (Siggelkow’s 2007); whereas studies that support statistical 
generalization may have limited use or be misleading since they depend on having already made 
basic assumptions.  A systematic review, the highest form of knowledge in EBMgt (Briner and 
Denyer, 2012) is not likely to deliver new theoretical insights.   
Rather than seeing narrative as an inferior category nested within evidence, we have afforded 
them an equivalence, at times subordinating evidence to narrative - excavating both to show that 
contemporary debates have their ancestry in older exchanges.  At the same time as developing 
this equivalence, we show ways in which they differ, overlap and intertwine.  EBMgt avoids 
engaging with fundamental problems and incoherence and instead relies on the narrative 
technique of digression - as a kind of detour on the way to an agreed destination.  But digression 
in narrative can be an end in itself, when it satirizes and disrupts implied linearities in time and 
form.  Here it is used to problematize a narrow construction of evidence.  One implication of this 
analysis is that the EBMgt project is fatally flawed since it is impossible at this stage for its 
advocates to acknowledge, coherently, that it is a narrative.  This is not to say EBMgt will not be 
popular or endure, it is merely to say it will remain unreflective and incoherent - in these senses, 
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EBMgt did not last.  A second possibility is that this analysis can help us to view narrative and 
evidence as entities that can be held in a productive, paradoxical tension (Smith and Lewis, 
2011) in the service of something higher, the advancement of knowledge and understanding, 
both broadly defined.  In terms of operationalization, this might lead to mixed methods research 
and alternatives or complements to systematic reviews; but of course in substance it goes beyond 
that.  It is an acknowledgement of the value of accepting different epistemologies and ontologies, 
and the recognition that they can potentially speak to each other rather than past each other (Lee, 
1991).  To emphasize, we are not trying to assist the EBMgt project, but to promote radically 
different views on evidence. 
Conclusion 
In the works that advocate EBMgt there is never doubt that problems will be overcome, because 
the destination has been decided.  That critical perspectives are a detour, where arrival is never in 
doubt, is another feature of EBMgt that makes it more like the under-labourer for capital, than 
the under-labourer in pursuit of knowledge.  The value of a Foucauldian, archaeological 
perspective is that it encourages us to see our views on 'evidence' and fact as historically 
contingent.  It is not as though we have at last arrived at, or are nearing (Briner and Rousseau, 
2011), a place where there is no longer a need to question fundamentals.  Foucault also teaches 
us that far from being the result of Lockean, empirical science, things such as EBMgt reflect the 
perspective of a community, and the views of our age.  They also come about through the 
deliberate attempts by people in positions of power to change collective understanding of what 
terms like 'evidence' mean. 
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Digressions in the EBMgt narrative are not the kinds of digression Sterne employs - where the 
form of narrative itself is used to show the limits and complexities of evidence, and to reject 
attempts to subordinate the complexities of being human to a neat story about experience and 
association.  The digressions in the EBMgt narrative reflect a more intensely ideological choice - 
to assimilate experience and critique in whatever way supports the pursuit of a goal, where the 
destination has been determined.  In this sense EBMgt is profoundly unscientific. 
We do not advocate a free-for-all, anything-counts-as-science position. Standards of validity and 
plausibility, logic and rigor can apply to different forms of evidence; and can have particular 
meanings and uses with respect to these forms of evidence.  What we oppose is the gradual 
development of an adjudicator or regulator of what can achieve the exalted status of “evidence” 
in social science, since inevitably this will be against the best interests of both knowledge and 
society. If an EBMgt paradigm, as currently conceived, was regulating the conduct of social 
science, countless ground-breaking developments would not have had occurred, or would not 
have had any legitimacy if they had occurred To take a familiar example, Gareth Morgan (1986) 
would have struggled to show how his metaphors, that have had immense impact in organization 
theory, were additive in any way, or that they reliably led to the same conclusions when applied 
to ambiguous social situations. Many other rich ways of re-describing and re-imagining social 
phenomena, that could reap huge insights, would also be dismissed and devalued, from 
Bourdieu, Marx, Freud, Latour, and countless others. 
In passing, it is interesting to speculate as to how the career of the 20th Century collosus 
Wittgenstein would be evaluated under an evidence-based regime.  Wittgenstein’s (1955) move 
from his early, positivist writings in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus towards the generative 
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insights demonstrated in his later work of philosophical investigations (1968) would be regarded 
as a profoundly retrograde step; rather than seen as the celebrated, second thought revolution that 
underpins contemporary understanding of language.  Foucault’s masterful Archaeology of 
Knowledge (2002b) would be seen as having no value as science. Yet this is a book which has 
energised intellectuals and the mass public alike; inspiring profound and searching questions 
about the very nature of science.  By doing so, it stands as the paradigm example of how to 
engage non-specialists in a conversation about research.  These are gigantic and glaring counter-
factuals, but if EBMgt becomes more popular and prevalent we risk relegating a plethora of 
similarly minded contributions - that demonstrate or depend on innovation, serendipity, novelty, 
idiosyncracy, to second-class forms of knowledge, if they are counted as knowledge at all.  
A pluralist approach to knowledge is something to be preserved and cherished, particularly when 
rules are being noisily laid down about what is legitimate, valid, useful or enlightening 
knowledge.  Pluralism is part of good science as well as part of the human spirit, and these things 
motivate our critique. Conversely, the narrowing of research horizons to sanctioned forms of 
knowledge, overshadowed by hegemonic discourse is dangerous. The dangers are that genuinely 
new perspectives will be drowned out, or never emerge, that advances in our understanding will 
be marginal and predictable, and that scope for insight into the human condition will be 
compromised. 
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1
 In EBMgt discourse, 'narrative' is usually presented as a straw man that is somehow defective, to be knocked down 
in favour of something more scientific.  This applies most obviously in making the case for the systematic review as 
a superior form of knowledge production, but also to the pathologizing of managers who resist evidence in the form 
of scientific findings, and more widely still to the idea that particular cases and circumstances should always be 
subordinated to an evidence base.  Madhavan and Mahoney (2012: 85) call on Egger, Schneider and Smith's (1998) 
(here false) dichotomy, 'that formal meta-analysis of observational studies can be misleading and that insufficient 
attention is often given to heterogeneity does not mean that researchers should return to writing highly subjective 
narrative reviews.'  Frese et al. (2012: 99) state, 'Narrative literature reviews put together the literature in an 
unsystematic and often biased way' (both documents that are themselves narrative reviews).  Pfeffer and Sutton 
(2006: 4), in a book that contains many excellent and illustrative stories, set severe limits on when stories are 
acceptable, 'Good stories have their place in an evidence-based world, in suggesting hypotheses, augmenting other 
(often quantitative) research, and rallying people who will be affected by a change.'  Giluk and Rynes-Weller (2012: 
141), at the same time as trying to address the problem that practitioners resist research findings, acknowledge 
people, 'have a strong preference for anecdotal evidence... narratives (such as stories and anecdotes) are how we 
39 
                                                                                                                                                             
make sense of the world... when it comes to stories versus statistics, people generally prefer the stories.'  Anecdotes 
(see Rousseau, 2006) are frequently the basis for appeals to use EBMgt, yet these are at the base of a hierarchy of 
evidence.  Denigration of narrative is a concern felt by critics of evidence-based medicine, 'the evidence of 
testimony or opinion has been identified as dirt on the lens of science, which [evidence-based medicine] has been 
created to remove, and its methods are such as to eliminate the complexity of individual variation' (Roberts, 2000: 
432). 
